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Summary findilngs
Within the current  rules of the game, Argentina's central  the sector (which could give it greater access to outside
bank (BCRA) is charged with being the lender of last  liquidity) and prudential strengthening of the system.
resort as well as providing full convertibility between  Triage of weaker banks should continue and not await
pesos and U.S. dollars - two objectives with one  another crisis. More experience with the new liquidity
instrument, namely, reserves. Within those rules, it may  policy is needed and so is reform of the settlement
well be that the balance of responsibilities needs to shift.  system, as it affects the functioning of the interbank
Complete dollarization can significantly reduce risks but  market, which is essential for containing crises.
not entirely eliminate them. If the BCRA can concentrate  Essentially, however, no grand solution seems to exist
more on building up reserves and helping to ward off  for the problems that seem inevitable in a system where
crises of confidence in the currency, perhaps the banking  the central bank is also the currency board. Argentina's
system can protect  itself better from liquidity shocks. But  strategy must therefore  turn on actively strengthening its
this will require, among other things, consolidation of  banking systems to reduce the risks of insolvency.
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The role of a central bank as the lender of last resort for financial institutions has a long
history.  The evolution of dominant commercial banks, such as the Bank of England and
other European commercial banks, from private institutions to government agencies, and the
establishment of the Federal Reserve System in the United States, were strongly influenced
by the perceived inability of private institutions to stop financial panics.
The analytical argument for this government function has been refined considerably in recent
years.  There is now widespread, but not universal, agreement that asymmetric information,
which accounts for the existence of financial intermediaries, also makes them prone to self
perpetuating declines in asset values during a "panic."  Modem, fractional reserve banking
systems are inherently unstable in that, although an incentive compatible regulatory
framework will encourage bankers to insulate their portfolio from diversifiable risk, common
shocks-systemic  risks-reduce  the market value of banks' assets.  Any system in which the
value of bank liabilities do not also decline is viable only if a lender of last resort is willing
and able to transfer wealth to depositors.  This implicit liability taken on by such a lender of
last resort (LOLR) can be reduced in a number of ways but not entirely eliminated.  An
LOLR steps in because bank failures entail economic costs related both to a breakdown of
the payments system and the special role banks play in evaluating credit risks.
It is also widely accepted that the existence of a lender of last resort is itself a distortion that
can reduce the probability of declines in asset values but at the cost of subsidizing private
investment decisions that are inefficient and potentially very costly. The solution currently in
place in industrial countries is that institutions benefiting from lender of last resort facilities
are constrained both in their investment decisions and in their capital and liability structures.
While solutions other than regulation have a long history as logical arguments, there is little
recent experience with how they might work in practice. The classic prescription is to do
away with banks as we know them by requiring that insured institutions hold highly liquid
reserves against most or all of their monetary liabilities.  While these alternatives are
discussed below, it should be kept in mind that attempting to operate a financial system2
according to such a scheme would be a considerable step into the unknown.  For this reason
we focus on the traditional trade-off between insurance and regulation. The plan of the paper
is as follows.  In the next section we first put the issues into the Argentine context and
examine the operation of the quasi-currency board in the post-tequila banking crisis of 1995.
Then we turn to reviewing how other currency boards have handled the LOLR issue, and
finally look at the analytics of the problem.  Section III explores the risks that must be
absorbed by any lender of last resort in a fractional reserve banking system, while section IV
discusses the role of reserve or liquidity requirements or the option of full dollarization of the
banking system.  Section V considers the risks associated with changes in the exchange rate,
which any fixed rate arrangement faces. The final section (VI) explores a range of policy
options to augment or reduce the need for the central bank to exercise its lender of last resort
function.
11.  Currency  boards  and lenders  of last  resort
The Argentine Case
Argentina provides the clearest case of a quasi-currency board attempting, in the end
successfully, to ward off the effects of a sharp financial shock. The events of the post-tequila
crisis of December, 1994-April 1995 are described in Box I and can be summarized as a
combination of liquidity crisis and confidence crisis which resulted in an outflow of $8
billion in deposits in a 3-month period, equivalent to 16% of total banking system deposits.
The difficulties of the Argentine system stem first and foremost from the dual role that the
Central Bank is obliged to perform: i) provide limited lender of last resort (LOLR) functions
to the extent that it has excess reserves, defined as reserves over and above the necessary 1:1
backing of the currency and other monetary liabilities and (ii) provide full convertibility
between pesos and US Dollars.  In the early 1995 crisis, the Banco Central de la Republica
Argentina (BCRA) lost $ 4 billion in reserves. It thus came close to the margin of its own
convertibility requirements.The December  1994-April  1995
Argentine  Banking  Crisis
Initial Shock
*  Domestic mini-crisis following failure of bond trading house shakes confidence and
causes banks to cut lines to these "mayoristas."
*  Tequila effect shakes confidence in LA and investors re-evaluate Argentine exposure.
*  Stock and bond markets suffer large losses.
*  Banks call in loans extended to dealers and provincial banks, now largely insolvent (due
to earlier mismanagement).
Aftershock
*  Sensing increased risks to convertibility, deposit withdrawals begin -- $2b. in two weeks.
*  Liquidity crisis forces banks to cut credit lines.
*  BCRA persuades top 5 banks to provide $250m. in safety net.
*  BCRA establishes second net via reserve requirement reduction for top 25 banks, yielding
$790m.
Continuing Crisis
*  Deposits fall further Jan-Mar 1995, reaching 16% reduction or $8b.
*  Interbank interest rates skyrocket.
*  Dollarization increases.
*  BCRA extends extraordinary liquidity assistance above limits of bank capital and for
longer than 30 days, totaling $1  .7b. rediscounts and $300m. repos.
*  Some banks fail.
Freefall Stops
*  International package (IMF, IBRD, IDB) plus domestic and international bond issues
restore confidence.
*  Strong commitment to convertibility maintained, although reserve level falls by $5b.,
close to minimum possible.
*  Deposit insurance (limited, privately financed) announced.
*  Dual bank restructuring funds to privatize provincial banks and restructure private banks
established with aid of multilateral banks.
*  Fiscal strengthening plans announced.
Outcome
*  Bank consolidation as 28 cooperative and 5 wholesale banks close.
*  Provincial banks moribund, fifteen in process of privatization/closure.
*  Top 10 private banks increase market share as deposits begin to return.
*  Crisis ends with $8b. deposit outflow having been covered by reserve loss ($4b.), BCRA
liquidity ($2b.), loan reductions ($lb.) and foreign loans ($1b.).4
In its role as LOLR, the BCRA was forced to provide liquidity to smaller and weaker banks
and it did so to the tune of about $ 2 billion. Much of this has been repaid, but at least $300
million and as much as perhaps 3.5 billion is not recoverable. In addition, a total of about
$2.5 billion will have to be spent out of public coffers to finance the public provincial bank
closures and privatizations, at least half financed initially by multilateral loans, and another
$500 million will be spent to help facilitate private bank mergers and acquisitions.  (In
addition, the public's direct losses in failed private banks, since there was no deposit
insurance in effect at the time of the crisis, could be on the order of 2% of deposits or perhaps
some $ 800 million.)  In total, therefore, not counting impaired portfolios but rather actual
costs, the amount lost by the public directly and indirectly approaches 1.6% of GDP. This is a
far smaller amount than expected and far smaller than that experienced in other banking
crises (see Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod, 1996a, Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996).
That the Argentine system is better positioned to withstand an external shock than it was in
1995 is nevertheless clear. Evidence includes the facts that: a) the worst performing public
sector banks have largely been identified and are in the process of being excised from the
system via privatization and/or closure actions and 15 banks are in this group; b) the worst
behaving private sector banks-- including wholesale banks that were engaged in questionable
lending activities  are mostly bankrupt and out of business and cooperative banks have been
merged and are, at least according to the Superintendency of Banks, stronger banks as a
result; c) limited, private deposit insurance has been instituted, covering up to $20,000 in
total deposits and this is apt to make future bank closures utilizing the BCRA's powers to
segregate assets and liabilities of intervened banks granted under Article 35 bis of the revised
Law of Financial Entities more likely in any future crisis; d) the concentration of deposits in
larger banks means that the BCRA may be faced with a smaller liquidity problem in the
future if the confidence in smaller banks is impaired; and e) both the BCRA and the
Superintendency have learned on the job how to function in a systemic crisis of major
proportions.
The difficulty remains, however, that banking crises in Argentina are hard to isolate and that
systemic crises, even if they do not affect all banking segments equally, are apt to risk both
bank solvency and ultimately convertibility itself. Hence the search for alternatives to the5
limited LOLR ability of the Argentine Central Bank (Pou, 1995). Rojas-Suarez and
Weisbrod (1995a) show the volatility of interest rate changes, which of course serves to
reduce the value of existing assets of banks and drive illiquid banks to insolvency, are higher
in the case of Latin American banking crises, which may complicate distinguishing solvency
and liquidity problems. This phenomenon may well be related to the finding by Caprio and
Klingebiel (1996) that Latin American banking crises in the 1980s were more likely preceded
by rapid real credit growth, well in excess of the pace of real GDP growth, compared with
bank insolvency elsewhere.
Recent developments which affect the necessity of utilizing LOLR functions in the BCRA
are worth noting. First, the BCRA has abandoned reserve requirements in favor of a liquidity
policy and has eliminated distinctions between demand and other deposits. An across the
board 15% liquidity policy is in effect for all deposits less than 90 days tenor. Second, there
is now greater choice of legally acceptable liquidity instruments, including the ability to hold
liquidity requirements in deposits in foreign banks, in OECD country government issues, and
in other approved assets, among them new government of Argentina issues. The net result
has been an increase in liquidity holdings -- a change in preferences in favor of lower risk
assets -- of banks in many cases above the minimum required by the BCRA.  Indeed, this has
caused a drop in lending as banks find the combination of security and return attractive.  One
implication, however, is that banks are taking an increasingly independent responsibility for
their own liquidity needs, and implicitly relying less on the limited LOLR powers of the
quasi-currency board.
The final observation on the current condition of the Argentine banking sector concerns the
consolidation in the number of banks and the increased concentration of deposits in the larger
banks. The number of Argentine banks, which totaled some 200 two years ago, stood at 168
before the crisis, at 143 six months after the crisis and is 124 in early 1996. Independent
estimates by bank analysts indicate that only about half of these are expected to remain in a
3-5 year period and recent interest in mergers and acquisitions bears this out.  Size will be an
important determinant of survivability in Argentine banking, which has some implications
for the sharing of liquidity risk between the private banks and the BCRA. In terms of
deposits, between November 1994 and June 1995, the ten largest banks increased their share6
of private bank deposits from 49% to 57% and this trend likely continued. Accompanying the
large return in deposits during late 1995 and early 1996 has between a pronounced shift
towards dollar denominated deposits. For example, of the $ 3.3 billion increase in deposits
between July 1995 and December 1995, some $ 2.6 billion was in US Dollar-denominated
accounts.
Nevertheless, despite banking system strengthening, a risk-adjusted capital asset
requirement of 11.5%,  and improved supervision, the Argentine system has had to deal with
the after-effects of the crisis in a climate of recession. Growtlh  in 1995 was negative 3.5% and
the quality of the loan portfolios of banks has suffered as a result. Recent estimates by the
BCRA ( Bulletin of Monetary and Financial Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 1995)  point to a ratio of
unprovisioned non-performing loans equal to 26.7% of net worth of banks as of October
1995 as compared with 18.7% prior to the crisis. This may partially explain the reluctance of
banks to lend and is seen in the large increase in bond holdings in the balance sheets of
private banks. This can also be seen as a defensive maneuver adding to the active liquidity
policy of banks and searching for ways to rely less on the limited role of the BCRA as
LOLR. These issues are addressed below.
How others  have coped
In the debate about the role of a LOLR in a currency board regime, a look at present and
historical examples is highly appropriate, and several stand out:  Hong Kong in recent years,
with its own currency board; Canada, prior to the formation of a central bank in 1935; the
free banking era in Scotland, roughly the 150 years up to the Peel Act of 1844; and individual
U.S. states before the Federal Reserve was founded in 1914. In all of these examples, there
was no explicit lender of last resort, but in many instances of crises, some LOLR appears to
have emerged.  If a shock is sufficiently serious, all governments appear to have been willing
to step in to alleviate the burden on depositors and to stem an actual or potential run on the
banking system.  Although it is possible to make the system more robust, such as by banning
demandable debt or allowing the market to create alternatives, legal restrictions and/or
societies'  preferences have limited these experiments.7
The most popular example of a currency board is that of Hong Kong prior to 1972 and more
recently since 1983. Although the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has not performed the
LOLR function, the government did in fact step in using its substantial reserves.  Significant
crises-truly  systemic ones-have  been avoided by high concentration in banking and
diversification of the banking system.  Although there are a large number of banks-about
165 in 1990 -- one bank, with its subsidiaries, controlled over 90% of banking deposits and
assets held by all local banks, and this one bank was significantly diversified outside Hong
Kong (Freris, 199  1). Thus Hong Kong's solution to the bank stability problem has been high
concentration, combined with excellent diversification (not simply within Hong Kong) and
the maintenance of a large stock of reserves for intervening. In the late 1  980s when several
small banks were in trouble, the foreign exchange assets of the Exchange Fund were about
23% greater than the total assets of all the small, local banks (that is, all local banks except
the one large banking group).  '  Only a very small part of the banking system had a portfolio
with significant sectoral or geographical risk concentration, and these banks were sufficiently
small that they could be dealt with on a case by case basis.  No bank was liquidated in the
1  970s or 1  980s, as, notwithstanding the authorities' free market philosophy, the Exchange
Fund (which holds Hong Kong's  foreign exchange reserves) was used to provide support.
Although neither pre- 193  5 Canada nor Scotland during its free banking era were currency
boards, they were conceptually similar in that there was no central bank.  However, each saw
a way to maintain relatively safe banking.  In Canada, nationwide diversification through
unlimited branching certainly contributed to the safety of the system; during most of the 19th
and 20'h centuries, Canada had only 30-60 banks, and enjoyed a markedly lower failure rate
(even in terms of losses per dollar of deposit) than in the United States. Nationwide
branching figured prominently in most explanations of the relative stability of the Canadian
system.2 Canadian banking stability also was aided by double-liability laws (as in the less
crisis-prone U.S. states) and high minimum capital requirements. Nonetheless, in some cases
it was judged necessary for the government to intervene.  In 1907, related to the panic that
began among N.Y. banks, several Canadian banks were threatened, and the government
stepped in to issue its own paper, even though this likely was not legal at the time.  The 1914
Finance Act legitimized such interventions, in effect giving the Finance Ministry LOLR
powers, which were used until the creation of a central bank in 1935. Notwithstanding the8
ability of individual banks to issue their own notes, the need to increase the elasticity of the
money supply was the prime argument for a central bank, as the LOLR functions already
were present.  Without a central bank, Canada was spared the policy-induced decline in the
supply of money that the U.S. experienced during the 1930s, but the depth of the depression
there spurred the demand for institutionalizing the capacity to expand money.
Scotland's free banking era also is instructive.  From 1695 to 1844, Scotland effectively had
a two-tiered system: there were three large, limited-liability banks controlling a large share of
banking activity, and numerous small banks whose owners faced unlimited liability.  During
the first part of this period, the unlimited-liability banks negated the threat of runs by offering
an option clause on their bank notes, to the effect that they promised to pay either the fixed
sum on demand or 6 months later that sum plus 5% (see Kroszner, 1996, or Cowan and
Kroszner, 1989). Bank runs were said to be unknown in Scotland, whereas they were
common in England.  To the extent that the option clause averted runs, it no doubt reflected
that the deferred payment had a positive net present value.  Also, the ability to issue bank
notes freely, disciplined both by unlimited liability and by the threat of adverse clearings,
helped to make the banking system elastic even without a central bank.  When the large
banks conspired to make the option clause illegal (the added attractiveness of the bank notes
of the unlimited-liability banks was a competitive threat), the banking system still was
safeguarded by the need for the small banks to conduct themselves prudently, and ultimately
by recourse to the Bank of England.
Lastly, the case of individual U.S. states during the pre-Federal Reserve era is also relevant
for countries with currency boards.  Essentially there were two different regulatory regimes
in place for much of U.S. history: unit banking, which prohibited any branching within states,
and branch banking, which permitted within-state branching, interstate branching being
forbidden.  Following the closure of the Second Bank of the United States in 1837, the so-
called free banking era began.  Banking was significantly more robust in the states with
branching, both because the banks were more diverse and fewer in number (Calomiris, 1990).
Branching banks in the South survived the crises of 1837 and 1857 by coordinating
temporary suspensions and resumptions of convertibility of deposits into cash.9
Branching was made more robust in several states by adopting unlimited mutual liability
laws for clearing house members.  These laws gave bankers the incentive to monitor one
another, which appeared to work quite well as long as the number of institutions remained
limited; 3 also in some instances, banks faced double-liability laws, which led to high capital-
asset ratios and lower failure rates. Unit banking states saw significant failures during these
crises, and in response they developed liability insurance schemes, all of which failed.
Each of these cases reviewed here included variations in the regulatory structure that made it
less likely that a LOLR would be needed: Hong Kong features a high concentration of the
banking system; in Canada, concentration plus good diversification due to the ability to
branch widely in a diversified economy; in Scotland, unlimited liability on bank owners,
which led to prudent risk taking; and in various U.S. states, better diversification with
branching and either mutual liability among banks participating in clearing houses or double
liability laws.
Thus countries with or considering adopting currency boards should institute the most robust
regulatory system possible, key elements of which include diversification and incentive
compatible regulation.  As most developing countries are small and undiversified, limiting
banks to branching within their borders will leave them with a large amount of
'undiversifiable" risk.  Allowing banks to branch abroad, or at least to hold a more
diversified global portfolio, will reduce the scope of"undiversifiable"  risk and so contribute
to their ability to withstand local shocks. Additionally, raising liability limits directly,
putting in place a mutual liability system, or arbitrarily boosting capital adequacy
requirements well above the BIS guidelines -- a path chosen in Argentina -- would help to
improve the incentive compatibility of banking.  Bank concentration, which can raise the
franchise value of bank licenses, also acts to encourage prudence.
However, regulatory arrangements cannot eliminate the possibility of a systemic banking
crisis, because they cannot eliminate systemic risk, and indeed in Hong Kong and Canada the
budget in effect became the lender of last resort.  Therefore, since some risk cannot be
diversified away, it is important that authorities consider how LOLR support will be provided
when it is needed. Current and historical cases suggest that, when it cannot be provided by
the central bank, it will come from the budget or a fund.  If it is the latter, then it is crucial10
that it have large resources relative to the risks faced.  In the absence of these resources, swap
lines with commercial banks or other external entities could fill this gap.  Ultimately,
however, rebuilding reserves or paying back a short term loan comes back to a fiscal
commitment by the authorities, and it therefore is important that authorities recognize this
feature of last resort lending when the ability to alter the stock of reserves is absent.
Analytical approaches
The underlying problem for a currency board can be thought of as a conflict between two
policy objectives and one instrument. The instrument is the board's stock of international
reserves.  The first policy objective is convertibility of the board's domestic currency
denominated liabilities into foreign exchange at an exchange rate that is "permanently" fixed.
These liabilities typically include currency and commercial banks' reserves held at the
currency board.  In most cases we think of this as a "fixed exchange rate commitment" that
appears to be credible because the Board's liabilities are backed by foreign exchange assets.
The second policy objective is often implicit and is the maintenance of convertibility of some
class of commercial bank deposits into currency or deposits at the currency board.  We often
think of this as a "lender of last resort" commitment.
Free convertibility between bank deposits and currency board deposits simply means that the
private sector can exchange bank deposits for cash at a ratio of one to one.  This commitment
can take the form of deposit insurance, which typically covers a subset of banks' deposit
liabilities, or more generally it can take the form of a commitment either to lend to banks or
to purchase banks' assets at a price that maintains banks' ability to convert some class of
deposits into cash at par.  In either case the central bank, or more generally the government,
protects depositors against losses on banks' assets that exceed the banks' capital, though this
protection need not be complete, universal, or automatic.
The key economic problem behind such insurance is that banks' asset values are not
independent draws from a distribution with a predictable aggregate value.  Economic shocks,
both those originating domestically and those from the rest of the world, can "permanently"
depress the market value of all domestic assets 4. In this event the insuring agency must have
access to assets, tax receipts, lines of credit or new issues of domestic currency or bank11
reserves; this final source of "credit," money creation, is the reason lender of last resort
responsibilities have typically been assumed by the central bank.  Nevertheless, there is no
reason in theory why the lender of last resort commitment cannot be undertaken by the home
government, a foreign government, or an international institution that does not have the
ability to issue new monetary liabilities.
The maintenance of convertibility between bank deposits and cash or deposits at the currency
board is not a logical necessity for a currency board.  In fact "orthodox" currency boards are
precluded from discounting domestic assets in order to maintain their domestic currency
value.  The absence of such a commitment means that the market value of domestic bank
deposits must reflect the market's valuation of the foreign exchange value of banks' capital
and assets.  Because bank deposits need not be convertible at par for cash, a run on banks
suspected of insolvency is possible only if the bank maintains convertibility. If this is not
possible either the bank is liquidated or the deposits at such banks would trade at a discount
relative to cash.  If all banks are suspected of insolvency, all bank deposits would trade at a
discount relative to cash. 5 In the more likely event that only some banks' solvency is in
doubt, there might be a run to safe banks if the suspected banks maintained convertibility, as
has occurred in Hong Kong occasionally, but if convertibility is not maintained these banks'
deposits would then trade at a discount.
Thus it seems to follow that a LOLR is a logical necessity for the maintenance of a unified
fixed exchange rate.  It appears to us inconsistent to argue that a currency board system that
has as its primary objective the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate can avoid a lender of
last resort commitment. The commitment of a currency board to convert its own liabilities
into foreign exchange may be of little practical importance in the face of declines in the
market value of banks' assets.
Banks can, for some time interval, induce the private sector to exchange cash for deposits at
par by offering high interest rates relative to cash.  In Estonia, for example, interest rates on
bank assets and liabilities have exceeded returns on assets free of default risk for substantial
time periods.  But ultimately offering a higher interest rate will only increase the odds that
the bank will fail6. At that point, depositors will demand cash and the currency board will
have to allow the bank to fail or to continue to function with its liabilities trading at a12
discount. In Estonia banks have been closed but losses minimized by government lending
that is equivalent to a LOLR.
The rules of the game for an orthodox currency board could be that banks suspend
convertibility of their deposits when depositors' demand for cash exceeds the bank's
reserves.  Bank deposits would then trade at a discount relative to the board's "cash"
liabilities, with the discount varying with the concerns about a given bank's portfolio.  This
maintains the banks' important role as financial intermediaries, but such a policy defeats the
main objective of the board, that is, to maintain the foreign currency value of domestic
money.  The policy imperative here is to protect the value of domestic currency by defending
the integrity of (some of) the banks.
Price inflation in such a system can be measured by the rate of devaluation of bank deposits
relative to dollars and convertible board money. Rolnick and Weber (1986) show that there
are many historical examples of a good and bad currency circulating side by side for long
periods of time.  The claim that "bad money drives out good" is only relevant under the very
unrealistic assumption that the mint, or in the modern context the central bank, follows a very
naive policy of unlimited convertibility at a fixed exchange ratio.  They also make the
interesting point that sellers of goods and services have a strong incentive to quote (high)
prices in the bad currency and offer discounts for buyers that offer to pay in the good
currency.  Quoting low prices in the good currency and demanding a premium for the tender
of bad currency would call in to question the legal tender status of the bad money.
Suspending convertibility then should be recognized as a way of increasing the flexibility of
a currency board, but at the cost of compromising the commitment to control domestic price
inflation.  These issues are revisited below.
The credibility of any lender of last resort depends on two important considerations.  First, in
the event of a general decline in value of commercial banks' assets, the lender must have
access to sufficient cash to meet any resulting deposit drain. Second, the lender must have an
incentive to buy assets at prices that the market, at the time, considers unrealistic.  This
second condition explains why private insurance schemes from third parties should not be
expected to be robust.  At the same time, it also points out why clearinghouse associations of
relatively small numbers of banks have been more successful: with relatively few players, the13
threat of contagion is more real, as is the possibility of supervising members' activities.
Mutual liability for losses also has worked to cement this interest (Calomiris, 1990).
Banks' deposits are typically some multiple of their reserves and so the lender of last resort
commitment requires a much larger stock of official reserves as compared to a pure currency
board. Since the currency board cannot issue its own monetary liabilities without the backing
of foreign currency reserves, the only reliable alternative to reserves would be a line of
foreign currency credit that could be automatically called upon by the board in the event that
the private sector wishes to convert its bank deposits into foreign exchange.
The resources needed to provide a credible lender of last resort commitment might be
reduced by restricting the issue of monetary liabilities by commercial banks and other
financial intermediaries to levels fully covered by safe foreign currency assets (private
reserves).  These reserves could be held in each bank or by a private insurance fund.  If such
a fund is established, it can economize on reserves by regulating the behavior of members.
But the savings are quite limited because a systemic shock hits all the banks at the same time.
The well known limitation of an effort to force banks to self insure with high reserve
requirements or liquidity requirements is that such regulations necessarily reduce the
profitability of banks. This, in turn, creates strong market pressure for nonbank financial
intermediaries to offer close substitutes for bank deposits.  When a large part of
intermediation has moved into less regulated financial markets, the central bank may face an
even more unstable system.  Moreover, we argue in section IV that reserve requirements may
not contribute to stability of a regime even if disintermediation is limited.  But first the next
section will look at systemic issues in modern banking systems; those familiar with these
issues may wish to skip ahead to section IV.
Ill.  Systemic  risks  common  to modern  banking
systems
Familiar risks to fractional reserve banking systems include bad luck in the form of changes
in international relative prices that reduce the market valuation of domestic firms and in turn
the commercial banks' claims on firms, and bad economic policies that cause investors to14
reevaluate the potential earnings from the domestic capital stock.  A failure of market
oriented reforms and excessive accumulation of government debt are examples of the latter.
Banking Sector Risks
The LOLR function of central banks was developed to ensure an elastic reserve supply as a
means of responding to incipient banking panics and to reduce the chances that such panics
would occur. Thus, the LOLR serves a dual role: by responding to banking crises it can limit
contagion effects, while its very existence can represent a credible commitment to respond to
a crisis and thereby reduce the chances that one would occur. In this section we review
lessons from the literature that have shaped our understanding of the LOLR.  We start by
considering the sources of and consequences of banking crises.
Banking crises occur when a large fraction of the banking industry is unable to meet deposit
outflows or has become insolvent when valued at current asset prices. Individual banks face
risks of bankruptcy arising from idiosyncratic factors related to bad investments, from runs
by depositors, or from general adverse movements in asset prices. Each of these three
originating sources of bank failures can, potentially, lead to a banking crisis, and each can
imply different roles for policy authorities.
Sources of Bank Failures
Because banks hold risky assets, they face a positive probability of failure. This is
particularly true if banks have specialized expertise in overcoming problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard in making loans, since by their very nature, these problems only
arise in the presence of risk. Adverse selection is a particular problem in credit markets;
potential borrowers are likely to have much better information about their investment plans
and the likelihood of their success than do outside observers. Not only does this mean that
bad credit risks cannot always be identified, but it also means that bad risks may have a
greater incentive to borrow than do good risks.
As a consequence, the price of credit may be unable to equilibrate demand and supply in
domestic credit markets. In the face of an excess demand for credit, a higher interest rate does
not necessarily make additional lending profitable, since the pool of potential borrowers will
change as interest rates rise. Higher rates may simply attract a riskier pool of borrowers-the15
adverse selection problem-and  actually lower the lenders' expected return. In addition,
higher interest rates may induce borrowers to undertake riskier activities-the  moral hazard
problem. Thus, any lender will need to engage in monitoring activities, and the cost of such
monitoring may make lending unprofitable. 7
Because of the risk inherent in lending activities, then, individual banks will, on occasion,
fail. However, the risks of banking failures that result from idiosyncratic factors leading to
insolvency for an single bank are generally not important from a public policy perspective.
Individual banking failures are more likely to occur if the banking sector is characterized by a
large number of small banks with relatively nondiversified portfolios. However, this situation
is also one in which the failure of an individual bank is. of and by itself, of only minor
consequence for the economy as a whole.  If there is implicit or explicit deposit insurance
designed to reduce the threat of contagion, the potential for moral hazard problems to arise
will imply that policy makers will want to reduce the fragility of individual banks.
Contagion
Individual bank failures can pose a serious problem if they generate deposit runs on healthy
banks and lead to a banking panic. This possibility arises because, in the absence of deposit
insurance, depositors, as lenders to banks, also face problems of asymmetric information that
are similar to those faced by banks in their lending activities. If depositors are unable to
easily monitor the value of a bank's portfolio, then the failure of a single bank can alter
depositors'  expectations about the solvency of other banks, leading to deposit runs that
threaten all banks.
Runs adversely affect the real economy in three ways. First, depositor wealth is reduced as a
result of liquidation costs associated with selling bank assets to meet withdrawals. Second, by
shrinking the banking sector, investment activities heavily dependent on bank financing are
reduced. Although the same volume of credit could flow through fewer institutions, bank
failure can sharply reduce the extent of information on borrowers not sufficiently credit
worthy to fund themselves directly, and so lead to lower economic activity (Bernanke, 1983).
This effect, while less likely to be significant in more developed markets, more regularly16
characterizes developing countries, in particular outside major cities.  Third, by shrinking
bank liabilities which are part of the payments system, runs reduce the supply of money.
Contagion effects arise when the failure of an individual bank or a small number of banks
leads to runs that threaten the ability of the banking sector to meet depositor withdrawals.
This situation can arise even though the banking sector as a whole is solvent. Thus, financial
panics can originate with the bankruptcy of a small number of banks if depositors then fear
an inability to withdraw funds from a wider group of banks, thereby generating a widespread
financial panic.
By providing access to an elastic supply of bank reserves, the LOLR can ensure that solvent
banks facing deposit withdrawals are able to meet the demands of their depositors. In
addition, the existence of a LOLR can lower the incentive deposit holders at solvent banks
have to withdraw their funds; if they are confident the LOLR will provide short-term
liquidity, attempts to withdraw funds become unnecessary.
This discussion suggests that deposit insurance serves some of the same functions as a LOLR
in limiting banking crises. Specifically, deposit insurance is a substitute for the LOLR's
commitment to allow depositors to access their funds. As will be discussed below, however,
the same issues of asymmetric information that can give rise to panics also can imply that
measures such as deposit insurance or a LOLR create moral hazard problems that may make
bank failures more common.
Fundamentals and expectations
While general discussions of banking crises tend to associate contagion effects with depositor
initiated runs, the academic literature has, like the more general literature on asset pricing,
distinguished between financial panics based on fundamentals and panics basic on exogenous
factors akin to "sunspot" equilibria. This later view sees panics as triggered by random and
ultimately unpredictable events ("shifts in the beliefs of agents which are unrelated to the real
economy" Gorton 1988, p. 751) and depend on the sequential service characteristic of
banks-those  first in may get full redemption at par, while later those last in line may receive
substantially less.8 The former view has stressed the role of information-based panics, that is,
panics initially generated by the rational response of depositors to changes in information17
about the value of bank assets. The initial cause of a panic, then, is related to-movements in
economic fundamentals affecting the value of banking sector assets, such as interest rate
increases, general asset price declines, changes in economic policies that cause investors to
re-evaluate the potential earnings of banks' claims on firms, or sharp decreases in inflation
that raise ex-post real rates. 9
Gorton (1988) argues that the empirical evidence from the U.S. supports the view that
information based panics related to "fundamentals" provide a better description of actual
historical episodes of financial crisis. This implies that it is important to focus on the familiar
risks to fractional reserve banking systems, including bad luck in the form of changes in
international relative prices that reduce the market valuation of domestic firms and in turn the
commercial banks' claims on firms, or economic policies that cause investors to reevaluate
the potential earnings from the domestic capital stock.  A failure of market oriented reforms
or  excessive accumulation of government debt are further examples of changes that could
threaten the asset base of the domestic financial sector.  Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) find
that macro factors are potentially important: in a sample of over 80 crises in about 70
countries, in 75% of the cases there was a real terms of trade decline of over 10% in the years
leading up to the crisis, with the average drop of 21%.  However, they also note that in 100%
of the cases, poor incentive systems -- those that did not encourage bankers to take only
prudent risks -- were found.  While panics based on fundamental (micro or macro) factors
would seem then to be of greatest relevance empirically, open economies may also be subject
to crises that have the character of exogenous shifts in beliefs. The effects of the Mexican
economy on Argentina provide one such example.
Real Consequences of Panics
The consequences of banking panics will depend on the role played by banks. If the
Modigliani-Miller Theorem characterized the financial system, variations in the size of the
banking system would have no consequences for real economic activity. Bank borrowers
would simply turn to alternative, nonbank sources of funding, while substitutes for bank
liabilities would be used in undertaking transactions. There would be no compelling
argument for a LOLR or other policies designed to support the banking sector. However,18
contrary to this view, the banking sector is normally considered to play an unique and
especially pivotal role in the financial system.'0
Chinn and Dooley (1995) provide empirical support for the idea that bank credit is an
important determinant of investment and economic growth in countries with repressed
financial systems.  Their interpretation of data for a sample of Asian developing countries is
that bank deposit markets are highly integrated with international capital markets but bank
loan markets are somewhat isolated.  Since domestic firms cannot bypass the domestic bank
loan market, either by utilizing alternative domestic financial markets or international
markets, changes in the supply of bank credit are important determinants of domestic
spending decisions after controlling for the effects of changes in the supply of domestic
money.
Insurable risks
When the possibility of contagion can arise from the failure of a few banks as a result of
idiosyncratic factors, the lender of last resort function could be performed by a government
agency or a private institution. In this situation, however, the primary objective is to prevent
a banking failure from generating runs on solvent banks. Thus, the ability to reduce or
eliminate the incentive for runs is more important than the need to have mechanisms for
increasing banking sector reserves to stem a run in progress.  Deposit insurance may also
provide adequate protection against contagion effects in this case, eliminating the need for a
LOLR.
The traditional view did see the lender of last resort function as providing a form of
insurance. That is also why private institutions can.,  in principle, serve to insure healthy banks
against the risks of individual banking failures. When runs are initiated by depositors, the
problem is not "asset values" in some longer-term sense but the ability of banks to liquidate
at prices at which they are still solvent: the main issue is determining which institutions are
actually solvent in this longer-term sense and in ensuring that moral hazard problems (the
problems attendant with the investment by banks of riskless deposits in risky assets) are
limited.19
It is the need to determine bank solvency so that the LOLR does not lend to insolvent banks
that has justified much of the regulatory structure that generally characterizes the banking
industry. When bank assets are difficult to value, a private insurer, or an external agency that
has no regulatory authority, may have difficulty distinguishing solvent from insolvent banks.
In addition, the provision of insurance, either in the form of explicit deposit insurance or
access to a lender of last resort, will generate incentives for banks to adopt riskier investment
strategies since the insurance essentially subsidizes their risk taking activities. IFlere  again.
some regulatory oversight can serve to limit this moral hazard problem. To the extent that
such oversight is needed, however, the ability of a private insurer or an external agency to
substitute for the involvement of the domestic government may be limited.
Uninsurable risks
The situation is quite different when it is not the "misguided" attempts by depositors at
solvent institutions to withdraw funds that lies at the heart of the potential crisis; rather it may
actually be the case that the banking sector as a whole, or at least a significant portion of it. is
insolvent. General declines in asset prices will affect the entire banking sector, leading to
systematic declines in bank net worth. These declines can be caused by movements in
interest rate levels or the exchange rate. With liabilities whose nominal price is fixed, asset
price declines threaten the solvency of the entire banking sector.
However, if banks are to provide a source of credit that is able to deal with adverse selection
issues, while still issuing liabilities fixed in nominal value, risks will be inherent in banking.
So the issue becomes one of who bears the risk. In modem banking and financial systems
that someone is, to a large extent, the government (and so, ultimately, domestic taxpayers).
The government is the only agency that can do so because the risk of a general decline in the
market valuation of the capital stock is not an "insurable risk".  That is, we cannot insure the
value of banks'  liabilities on the basis of a calculation that some banks will fail but on
average the aggregate value of banks assets will be predictable.  General declines in the value
of banks' assets are commnon  and, if depositors are to be protected. require the government to
redistribute income, generally from tax payers to deposit holders, when the market value of
banks' assets decline.  To be sure, governments may not want to protect depositors, as a20
result of moral hazard problefms,  but with large.enough systemic shocks, most governments
will step in to at least lighten the burden on depositors.
A small open economy with a fixed exchange rate is obliged to allow changes in international
interest rates to affect the asset values of the entire banking sector, so that any lender of last
resort role is likely to involve lending to (temporarily) insolvent banks. If adverse selection
problems intensify during periods of high interest rates, as argued by Mishkin (1994),
domestic credit allocation and the level of economic activity will be adversely affected.
From the perspective of an open economy, the risk faced by the domestic banking system
may in part arise from the behavior of other countries. The impact of the Mexican crisis on
Argentina is an example-this  can be viewed as a form of externality, similar to the
externality faced by an individual bank whose risk of a run can depend on the investment
behavior of other banks-the  source of contagion effects. Just as this latter externality creates
a demand for insurance that could be provided by a private institution or a government
agency, the former risk faced by an open economy generates a role for insurance. However,
this cannot be provided by a domestic private agency since diversification arguments would
require the insurer to provide insurance across many individual economies. As argued above,
a private LOLR can deal with the case of contagion effects generated by the failure of a small
number of banks which then threatened those banks that are still solvent. However, this
traditional view of the role played by a LOLR, as a consequence, may be of little relevance to
the situation in which the risk is of a systematic asset decline that affects the asset value and
solvency of the entire banking sector.21
IV.  The Role  of Reserve  Requirements  in
Strengthening  a LOLR 11
100 % reserve banking
When banking panics affect the real economy through their impact on the payments system
and the stock of money, an apparently easy fix is to require that commercial banks insure the
convertibility of their own deposits into foreign exchange or domestic reserve assets (since
the currency board is committed to making domestic reserves and foreign exchange perfect
substitutes). Clearly, if banks were required to hold US Treasury bills equal to one hundred
percent of their deposit liabilities there would be no additional problem for the currency
board. In this way, individual banks, by in effect becoming money market funds, are
completely able to meet any deposit withdrawal at any time and contagion effects are
removed.
In the absence of a LOLR, the question arises as to whether banks could remain credible
under all circumstances while still holding less than 100% reserves against their deposits.
Evidence that they could not do so is convincingly provided by money market mutual funds
in the United States.  In these institutions there is no foreign exchange risk, but the market
demands a very conservative investment portfolio of short term government securities or
insured bank deposits in order to insure convertibility.
While complete reserve backing makes sense as a means of protecting the money stock and
the payments mechanism from banking panics due to contagion effects, it may not make
sense if it is bank lending that is important for economic activity. If banks are forced to hold
reserve assets equal to their deposit liabilities, then the obvious problem is that all domestic
maturity transformation is forced into nonbank institutions.  This has two flaws.
First, if nonbank institutions offer monetary deposits to the private sector we have simply
moved the problem to what are usually less regulated institutions.  In many cases such
institutions have been owned by banks and typically have borrowed from banks in the event
of a withdrawal of deposits.  There do not seem to be any modern examples of a banking
system that has been prevented from engaging in the profitable business of maturity
transformation.22
Second, adverse selection and moral hazard problems are particularly important in credit
markets. This means that forcing domestic maturity transformation into nonbank institutions
is inefficient to the extent that banks have particular advantages in overcoming the
informational problems associated with credit issuance. By developing long-term customer
relationships, using lines of credit and maintaining transaction account balances, banks are
better placed to provide monitoring services than are nonbank intermediaries.
In addition, forcing maturity transformation into the nonbanking sector requires that nonbank
institutions raise nondeposit external funds in order to lend for investment activity. But this
ignores the problems introduced by asymmetric information that are an important aspect of
banking. As Stein (1  995) has emphasized, adverse selection problems hamper the ability of
financial institutions to obtain funds. That is, some of the same problems that distinguish the
market for bank lending occur also in the markets in which banks, or other nonbank
institutions, raise funds (see Annex 1). The general conclusion that deposit and nondeposit
funding sources are not perfect substitutes in the presence of asymmetric information is a
robust one. Consequently, deposit outflows will reduce the ability of banks to lend; real
investment and real economic activity will be affected. To the extent that lending is forced
into the nonbank sector, the financing of investment activity is made more dependent on
external, nondeposit funding and, consequently, to more serious adverse selection problems.
The fundamental problem is that the community wishes to transform some current output into
a capital stock, the capital stock is itself illiquid. If any claims that ultimately derive their
value from the capital stock have fixed nominal values, there is a risk that someone must
bear. This has the implication, though, that a second possible solution to banking sector
instability in the absence of a lender of last resort would involve moving away from fixed
nominal value liabilities.
With less than 100% reserves, the comparative advantage of banks in the credit process is
utilized but the need for a LOLR again emerges. Open market operations as a measure of
providing an elastic supply of reserves can serve as an alternative to such a lender. However,
this just shifts the issue of how reserves are created, or who holds a sufficient inventory of
reserve assets from the currency board to the agency empowered to conduct open market
operations.23
In summary, while private insurance or publicly backed deposit insurance can effectively
serve to eliminate contagion effects arising from the failure of a few banks, they cannot serve
to support the financial system in the face of general asset declines that affect the solvency of
the entire banking industry.  Since banking sector contractions triggered by a crisis will have
adverse effects on economic activity through either credit or money supply channels, some
mechanism is required that can provide an elastic supply of reserve assets if necessary. Such
mechanisms need to address two situations. First, a credible commitment to ensure the value
of bank deposits can eliminate the incentive for depositors to make withdrawal during an
incipient crisis. By eliminating, or reducing the risk of contagion effects, the major impact of
financial crises can be avoided. Second, by providing an elastic supply of reservable assets.
actual deposit runs can be contained without the need for banks to close their doors.
Are high reserves an option?
If 100% reserves cannot serve to support the financial system. are high reserves an option'?
In this section we analyze a policy designed to limit risk by requiring banks to engage in
maturity transformation but nevertheless to hold liquid reserves that are high relative to what
the banks would choose to hold.  These reserves might be interest bearing or not.  Moreover
they need not be held at the central bank but could be held in any liquid form.  The issue is
whether or not such reserves serve as a "cushion" to absorb changes in the private sector's
preferences for bank deposits and other assets.  If one hundred percent reserve requirements
might stabilize the system, a natural question is whether or not "high" reserve requirements
might also stabilize the system but with lower costs in terms of disintermediation.
Banking markets in developing countries have been characterized by relatively high reserve
requirements.  Financial markets in such economies are typically dominated by commercial
banks and financial repression is an important source of revenue in many cases.  As shown in
Drazen (1989) the key to this revenue is the imposition of reserve requirements on all bank
liabilities.  This would normally encourage the growth of nonbank financial intermediation,
so a natural extension of this policy is to discourage development of domestic nonbank
financial intermediaries and to impose capital controls that discourage nonbank borrowing in
foreign markets.24
Another form of disintermediation would be for domestic firms to seek credit in foreign
markets.  But in most emerging markets, domestic nonfinancial firms cannot bypass domestic
banks because it is difficult for the firm to offer foreign lenders credible information about
their financial condition. Asymmetric information is a well known problem that limits
lenders' ability to distinguish between good and bad credit risks.  In developing countries,
disclosure of financial information is not mandated by law as a condition for access to equity
or bond markets,  traded equity is limited to a few of the largest firms and accounting
standards are less commonly applied.  This presumably makes the information generated by a
relationship with a domestic bank, that at least has information about the firm's  and the
firm's owners' transactions, valuable and difficult to replicate.
A model of a partially open financial system:
These institutional constraints suggest that we can better understand the possible effects of
high reserve requirements in a model in which domestic bank loans are "special" but in
wlhich  the domestic bank deposit market is highly integrated with international financial
markets.  In this section we utilize an open economy version of a model developed by
Bernanke and Blinder (1988).  The primary conclusion suggested by the model is that high
reserve requirements magnify the size of private capital inflows when expected yields favor
developing countries but also magnify the size of private capital outflows when expectations
change.  It seems to follow that a large stock of liquid reserves held by the banks does not
really offer protection from changes in the market's valuation of bank loans relative to
foreign assets.  The important lesson is that as the reserve requirement rises, the size of the
private capital inflow and the change in the central bank's reserve also increases.  Moreover
the response is symmetrical for inflows and outflows.
To focus on these implications, consider a simplified model of the financial sector under a
fixed exchange rate. Banks hold reserves, loans and government securities. Bank liabilities
are domestic demand deposits ('money')  and nonmonetary deposits. Both are assumed to be
subject to a legal reserve requirements of t. To capture the special nature of bank lending, we
assume that domestic firms can issue only bank loans. The absence of both a nonbank bond
market and a market for firm equity reflect asymmetric information and regulatory
constraints. Deposits, foreign bonds and domestic government bonds are perfect substitutes;25
the return on deposits will be r. The central bank issues reserves; its assets are domestic
government securities and foreign reserve assets.
The formal model is developed more fully in Annex 2, but the basic implication is that the
stock of reserves will be determined by the loan market equilibrium condition. Intuitively,
profit maximizing banks will set the loan rate equal to r/(l-t),  their marginal cost of funds.
Thus, the equilibrium quantity of loans is determined by loan demand at a loan rate of r/( I -t).
With the demand for monetary assets also a function of r, for given income levels, the
banking sector's nonmonetary deposits must adjust to fund the quantity of loans demanded.
With monetary and nonmonetary deposits now determined, the demand for bank reserves is
simply t(M+D).
A fall in world interest rates lowers the domestic loan rate and increases the quantity of loans.
Banking sector deposits must rise and this determines the change in the quantity of banks'
nonmonetary liabilities; this in turn also changes the demand for reserves depending on the
reserve requirement against nonmonetary liabilities.  If the central bank was entirely passive,
the increase in the demand for bank reserves would be met by an increase in supply generated
by unsterilized intervention in the form of purchases of international reserve assets by the
central bank.
A shift in money demand does not increase the demand for reserves since the shift from
interest bearing deposits to monetary deposits, which carry the same reserve requirements,
1  2 leaves the net demand for reserves unchanged  . The increased demand for reserves comes
from the shifts in the bank loan market.  As shown in Annex 2, the impact of a change in the
world level of interest rates on reserves depends upon the reserve requirement t and the
elasticity of loan demand to the loan rate.
This analysis assumed profit maximization on the part of banks, thereby ensuring a simple
relationship between the loan rate and the deposit interest rate. This represents one approach
to answering the difficult question of how the spread between the deposit rate and the loan
rate should be modeled.  Romer and Romer (1993), for example, assume that the spread
decreases as r declines.  This makes sense because the implicit tax imposed by a noninterest
bearing reserve is increasing in r, that is, the tax per dollar of loan is r/(l-t).  Thus, higher26
nominal interest rates imply a larger absolute spread and falling interest rates would be
associated with a fall in the spread.  It follows that the higher the reserve requirement the
greater is the change in the loan rate in response to a change in the world interest rate.  This
means that high reserve requirements do not help insulate the domestic economy from the
transmission of shocks from international capital markets.
So far we have focused on the effects of a given reserve regime as world interest rates
change.  But what is the effect of a change in the differential reserve'? Suppose for example
that a fall in the world interest rate and the resulting capital inflow induces the government to
raise the reserve requirement.  A rise in the reserve requirement increases the loan rate
relative to the world rates, so the impact effect on the demand for loans is negative. The
impact effect on reserves and private capital flows can also be shown to be negative.
Thus, the immediate effect is to reduce the capital inflow and the gain in reserves.  But other
things equal, the rise in reserve requirements clearly increases the cost of bank loans.  In
effect the domestic borrower must pay the tax on the marginal foreign money.  This has the
effect of discouraging the transmission of the real effects of the interest rate change.  So
evidently a constant high reserve requirement has perverse effects.  But an endogenous
reserve requirement policy that increases reserve ratios as world rates fall succeeds in
insulating the domestic loan market from the external shock.  The "sterilization'" policy
succeeds not because it discourages international capital mobility but because it discourages
domestic financial intermediation.
In summary, high reserve requirements seem to be perverse in that a high level for reserves
on nonresident deposits increases the sensitivity of private capital flows and domestic credit
to a monetary disturbance.  A high level of the reserve requirement also magnifies the change
in international reserves generated by a foreign monetary shock.  Although a high level of
reserve requirements on bank deposits seems to be counterproductive, the model also implies
that changes in the level of reserve requirements can fully insulate the domestic economy
from the foreign monetary policy shock.  It is important to remember, however, that in this
framework the banking system is being "stabilized" by changes in the taxation of domestic
financial intermediation, large variations in which can be expected to lead to a permanently
smaller banking system.27
The main problem for the LOLR is the adverse effect changes in interest rates have on banks
asset values.  It is true that with high reserve ratios the average decline in banks' asset values
will be much lower, and that most of the capital outflow will be easily covered by liquidation
of banks' reserves.  But it is also true that the capital outflow itself is larger.  As with low
reserve requirements, the financial system is brought into equilibrium by changes in the
domestic loan rate.  But with high reserve requirements, these changes in domestic loan rates
are magnified. The greater volatility of the domestic loan rate tends to increase the risk of
insolvency of domestic firms and in turn increases the risks faced by the LOLR.  This in part
was the very real problem faced by the Argentine authorities in the post-tequila shock and the
resulting banking crisis of early 1995. Asset values plummeted, deposit withdrawals ensued.
interest rates rose to distress levels, and the system's limited LOLR capacity was severely
tested.
V.  Currency Boards  and the Credibility  of the
Exchange  Rate Peg
The discussion to this point has, in general, considered the role of a LOLR that serves to
insure the domestic currency value of the bank sector's liabilities. However, another factor
that can magnify the effects of international interest rate changes are expectations that the
exchange rate peg might be changed. The currency board faces this additional risk because it
is insuring the foreign currenOcy  value of some set of domestic deposit liabilities. As long as
the exchange rate commitment is not perfectly credible, the existence of domestic currency
and foreign currency assets and liabilities on banks' balance sheets is an important source of
solvency risk even if the currency positions are balanced.
The problem is that one of banks' main functions in the system is to bear maturity risk.
During a time period in which the board's commitment to the fixed exchange rate is not fully
credible, any shock that increases the political cost of maintaining the fixed exchange rate
increases the exchange risk premium component of domestic currency interest rates.  The rise
in interest yields paid on domestic currency denominated assets depresses the market value of28
banks'  long term domestic currency assets.  This reduction in the market value of long term
assets is not matched by a reduction in the value of banks' short term domestic currency
liabilities.  Thus even a balanced foreign exchange position leaves the banks exposed to
changes in exchange rate expectations.
If all bank assets and liabilities were denominated in foreign currency, this risk would be
eliminated, althcouglh  changes in dollar interest rates would still generate capital gains and
losses on hanks' assets.  Experience suggests that changes in dollar interest rates have been
quite small relative to changes in domestic currency interest rates in Argentina and other
developing countries that have fixed their exchange rates.  It seems to follow that complete
dollarization would contribute to the stability of the bankinig  system.
As discussed in some detail above. a lender of last resort must respond before it is possible to
distinguish transitory from permanent shocks to assct values.  In a similar way, it is very
difficult to identity changes in asset values generated by shifts in the credibility of the
exchange rate commitment.  Even after the fact, the inability to measure exchange rate
expectations makes it difficult to disentangle the lorces behind changes in yields on domestic
currency an(d  foreign currency assets.  Frankel and Okongwu (1996) analyze the determinants
o ldomestic interest rates in five  developing countries from 1987-1994 (Argentina, Chile,
Mexico. Philippines and Korea) and conclude that survey data on expectations about
exchange rate changes suggest that high domestic interest rates reflect both expected
exchange rate changes and a surprisingly large exchange risk premium.
The threat of'conitagion in the context of limited iinformation  seems identical for any of the
risks discussed above.  In the very short run, depositors will not be able to distinguish banks
that can survive a change in domestic interest rates from those that will not be able to do so,
particularly in cases where importanit  bank customers also suffer from the rise in short term
interest rates. '[his implies that a currency board with a mixed currency banking system is
not only unstable for the f'undamental  reason set out in section 1I but also because it is likely
to be subject to unusual changes in asset valuation. Such a system will require a generous
backstop.29
Complete dollarization of banks' assets and liabilities eliminates conversion risk. As argued
above, sharp increases in domestic currency interest rates when convertibility is called into
question may, in practice, be the most serious threat to banks' solvency.  As long as the
national currency exists, it is very unlikely that market forces alone will genierate  a
completely dollarized system.  Some types of transactions are likely to contilLue  to be made
with the national currency as long as it exists, and any difference of opinionl  about the
credibility of the exchange rate commitment will make private contracts denominiated in the
home currency attractive to some market participants.  C'omplete dollarizationi  of the
domestic banking system would  have to be enforced by law.  Baniks  mighlt  be licelised to
operate only in dollars or domestic currency deniomiiinated  assets and liabilities imighlt be
taxed.
The current currency mix of the Argentine banking system is an importanit  source of
instability. The rapid increase in the share of dollar denominated deposits in Argentine banks
following the introduction of the convertibility plan might be interpreted as the result of the
private sectors lack of confidence in the exchange rate regime.  But an1  equally plausible
explanation is that an increase in confidence in the domestic banking system induced
residents to move dollar denominated assets from off shore to domiiestic  banks.  'I'he  switclh  to
dollar denominated from peso denominated assets during the earlier period of high inflation
is likely to be persistent (Guidotti and Rodriguez, 1992). but the location ot'such assets will
be quite sensitive to current economic conditions.  Durinig 1994 and early 1995, noll-peso
deposits in Argentine commercial banks exceeded pesos deposits, reaching as muchi  as 57%
of all deposits at the end of March 1995. Returns on both types of deposits respond to
changes in international interest rates. But  the presence of both pesos and non-peso deposits
leaves the banking system subject to conversion risk, and, as argued above, sharp increases in
domestic currency interest rates when convertibility is called into questioni  may. in practice,
be the most serious threat to banks' solvency. C'onversioni  risk arising from expectations of
exchange rate changes would be eliminated under a completc dollarization of banking sector
assets and liabilities.
While partial dollarization of the banking system has been an important feature of several
stabilization programs (Savastano, 1995). it does not follow that the problem associated with30
a mixed system will solve itself by the private sector moving toward complete dollarization.
A reasonable interpretation of recent increases in the share of dollar denominated liabilities of
Argentine banks is that residents have repatriated dollar assets held offshore as conditions
have stabilized at home.  This process however is clearly limited.  As long as some
probability of exchange rate changes remains, peso denominated assets and liabilities offer
protection to some set of market participants.  It follows that the government would have to
tax these positions in order to reduce the threat of  capital losses for the banks.
This does not mean that the domestic currency money issued by the Board would have to be
dollarized.  Fischer (1982) identified the seigniorage tax the domestic economy would need
to pay to the U.S. to accumulate a growing stock of dollars as income, and with it. money
demand. grows as a cost of dollarization. But the Currency Board could continue to issue
fully backed domestic currency and could continue to collect the seigniorage associated with
this issue of noninterest bearing money.  In fact in a more stable environment the demand for
the Board's monetary liabilities would increase and in turn increase seigniorage.  Thus, the
authorities could argue that their desire to limit private banks use of their currency "brand
name" is evidence of their commitment to the convertibility law.
Dollarization does not, however, eliminate traditional credit risk nor does it eliminate risk
associated with movements in dollar interest rates (although, as noted above, these have
tended to be small relative to domestic rates).  Once the banking system is on a dollar basis,
the government cannot act as a lender of last resort unless it, in turn, has access to dollar
credits. In the Argentine case, the BCRA's ability to substitute 20% (and up to 33% in a
crisis) of its reserve backing with domestic dollar denominated issues would mean that it
would lose some of its limited LOLR capacity in a fully dollarized system.  The credibility of
the government's commitment to refrain from devaluation in order to stop a run on the banks
is of course now assured since devaluation of its own liabilities would not affect the value of
banks' assets or liabilities.
If this is what the authorities want to achieve, that is, a completely credible commitment not
to debase the currency, then complete dollarization seems to be a stable regime in the sense
that it obviates the risk that a shift in the private sectors expectations about devaluation could
bring the system down.' 3 It appears, however, that such a system would continue to face the31
'garden variety' risks faced by any fractional reserve banking system. Nevertheless,
dollarization of the banking system might be a useful policy since a LOLR would only have
to deal with familiar solvency problems.
VI. Examining  Alternative  LOLR  Options
Policy (herview.
The basic choice facing the authorities is to continue with a limited public LOLR function,
recognizing its shortcomings, or to move to a pure currency board arrangement. That
decision appears to have been made and one may argue that given the state of the financial
market development in Argentina today a full abrogation of the LOLR function may not be
feasible. Likewise, no credible alternative to convertibility has been proposed which would
serve to maintain the confidence of the Argentine public, although at least in theory some
form of constitutionally mandated " fiscal rule " is plausible. That being said, the outlook in
the immediate fuiture  is likely to be a continuation of a quasi-currency board system with
some LOLR capacity and a continuation of the central tenet of Argentine policy since 1991,
full convertibility on demand.
Experience clearly shows that no external official LOLR exists. Existing credit facilities at
the IMF, altlhough in theory designed to support exchange rate decisions of the Argentine
type from reversible, externally-induced shocks unrelated to macroeconomic fundamentals,
appear to be too slow to provide any immediate additional backing to reserves. Thus, the
BCRA remains boxed in by the limited amount of excess reserves that it holds at any point in
time. The multilateral development banks, like the World Bank, are committed to financial
sector development but are unlikely to put themselves in an active LOLR role which would
require them to rely on domestic supervision efforts to provide lines of credit on demand. The
issue of what is a liquidity problem and what is a solvency problem is not something that
international lenders are likely to feel comfortable judging in the midst of any crisis, the main
problem being that from time to time the international lender would have to make real
transfers in exchange for future claims.32
What has not been tried to a significant degree, the case of US assistance to Mexico being the
clear exception, are official bilateral lines or asset puts. The US Treasury has limited its
interventions to Mexico and the Federal Reserve System has shown no interest in performing
that role.  Some surplus economies, like Taiwan (China) or Norway, might not be adverse to
buying official (presumably high yield) debt, but to do so in a crisis places the purchaser in
the risky position of having to judge whether the crisis is one of confidence alone, either
externally or internally induced, or whether it has a more fundamental character.  In any
event, it seems inescapable that the international lender would have to become deeply
familiar with the supervision and prudential regulation of the banking system, and be able to
step in and force the closing of individual banks.  Unless government were willing to "farm
that function out," as for example some Asian countries have done for their customs service,
clearly an unlikely prospect, no official lender is likely to step into the LOLR arena.
It has been argued that a domestic LOLR is not necessary if the currency board allows
foreign banks to enter the domestic market and allows domestic banks easy access to
international capital markets.  Hanke and Schuler (1993) argue that "By eliminating
exchange risk with the reserve currency, the currency board will facilitate access of the
commercial banks in the currency board country to foreign financial markets.  The currency
board system will also encourage foreign commercial banks to establish branches, in effect
importing access to foreign financial markets."
There are two problems with this argument.  The first is the argument that domestic banks
enjoy an advantage in evaluating credit risks in emerging markets.1 4 Given little reliable
information of domestic firms, banks in emerging markets with established customer
relationships enjoy a large competitive advantage.  In the case of Argentina, easy entry into
domestic markets has not generated a large increase in foreign bank participation.  Schwartz
(1993) argues that the prevalence of branch banking in currency boards within the British
Empire was not a response to currency boards but to the colonial status of the countries, and
the associated reduction in political risk.
The second question is what would happen in response to a general decline in domestic asset
values. International banks might allow their branches or affiliates to fail if the local
government did nothing to support them in a panic situation. In fact, without some formal33
agreement, industrial country central banks would probably encourage such prudent
behavior.  Foreign central banks have the capacity to insure their banks' foreign branches but
the incentive to do so is weak.  Of course, this would certainly come at the expense of the
foreign commercial bank's reputation and ability to do business in the country in the future.
Hence, the more attractive the long term local investment climate, the less likely is this
reaction. Strategic alliances with foreign banks are a more likely possibility.  ' 5
Public Sector Actions to Strengthen the Reserve Position
A necessary condition for the long-term survivability of the system is that the Central Bank
have sufficient free reserves to offset a 'bad draw' for the foreign currency value of bank
assets.  Since claims on the private sector in the Argentine system are about $50 billion, an
adequate reserve is perhaps 20% or about $10 billion. Reserves could be increased  through
sales of long term government bonds to central banks in a strong surplus position. Relatively
high-yielding dollar bonds of the nation could be offered to central banks in East Asia, for
example, with the proceeds invested in short-term US dollar issues, the differential being part
of the price of extra insurance.  A second option might be to allow the central bank to retain
its profits, which could add another $ 2.5 billion in total reserves by the year 2000. In
addition, thought could be given to separating and eventually disposing of the Banco de la
Nacion, the largest bank in the country and one still in the public sector. Care would have to
be taken in privatizing it, so as not to allow the creation of any private bank too large to fail,
but forcing BNA into the rigor of the market-place has advantages even beyond its sale price.
It would also have the effect of reducing potential public liability associated with any
reduction in future asset values.
At the same time, one may argue that the LOLR rules should be made more stringent, not
weaker as some have argued, by: (i) enforcing prudential regulations and supervision very
strictly to match the "super capital-adequacy ratio" of 11.5%; (ii) using the powers available
to the BCRA through article 35 bis 6in non-crisis times to remove weak banks, say those
rated 4 and 5, from the system entirely; and (iii) allowing further consolidation of the
banking sector if and only if the resulting bank is as strong after the merger or acquisition as
before, and fully meeting all prudential requirements.34
The second aim of policy might be to reinforce the already apparent tendency of private
banks to watch out for themselves in trying to avert liquidity crises and the need to rely on
the official LOLR capacity. The best way to manage in a system of limited LOLR capability
is clearly to rely on it as little as possible, and on the other hand, to make it as expensive to
use as possible. In the case of the former, the recent shift to a liquidity policy in place of
reserve requirements is a major advance, and with respect to the latter, reforms which do not
allow banks receiving extraordinary liquidity assistance (originally offered for 30-60 days) a
total of up to 3 years to repay would be appropriate. This requires the repeal of BCRA
Communication A-2368 which extends the life of weak banks.
Another area of potential strengthening is in supervision rules, although large strides have
been made in recent years.  Mandatory intervention rules when risk-adjusted capital falls
below some pre-determined level is one possibility.  Some have suggested penalties for
central banks which offer forbearance to provide immediate disincentives. The key is to
force bank owners to act before the situation becomes critical by putting their equity at
greater risk sooner, and thus trying to force earlier mergers and acquisitions at the first sign
of danger.  Increased disclosure requirements and significant penalties for nondisclosure or
erroneous information, which make it easier for outsiders to monitor banks, also will lessen
the burden on the LOLR function.  Still, these moves to lessen the likelihood of having to
use LOLR interventions, however, are no substitute for increased reserves.
Summary
It may well be the case that within the existing rules of the game, in which the BCRA is
charged with both providing some LOLR functions as well as full convertibility of the peso--
basically two objectives with one instrument, namely reserves -- the balance of
responsibilities needs to shift.  Complete dollarization can significantly reduce the risks but
not entirely eliminate them.  If the BCRA can concentrate more on building up reserves and
helping to ward off crises of currency confidence, perhaps the banking system can provide
itself with greater protection from liquidity shocks. This will require, inter alia, that
consolidation of the sector, which has the potential of gaining greater access to outside35
liquidity, and prudential strengthening of the system. The process of triage of weaker banks
should continue and not await another crisis.  Greater experience with the new liquidity
policy is also required, and reforms are needed in the way the settlements system works as
this affects the functioning of the inter-bank market, which is essential for containing crises. 17
In sum, however, no grand solution appears to exist for what is inherently an inevitable
problem of a mixed central bank-currency board system.  The strategy therefore turns on
actively strengthening the banking systems to reduce solvency risks.36
Annex 1
Stein (1995) considers a simple model in which banks can use insured deposits or uninsured external financing
to fund new loans. Adverse selection arises because Stein assumes banks have private and unverifiable
information on the value of their existing loan portfolio. If there are two types of banks, those with "good" loan
portfolios, and those with "bad" portfolios, a separating equilibria exists in which good banks rely less on
uninsured external finance. The bank with the bad portfolio of existing assets has an incentive to borrow more
external finance since, if it goes bankrupt it does not need to repay. In order to distinguish themselves from the
bad banks in a separating equilibrium, good banks rely less on nondeposit funding sources and more on insured
deposits. As a result, an exogenous outflow of deposits forces good banks to reduce their own lending; simply
replacing deposit liabilities with nondeposit ones (as suggested would occur by Romer and Romer 1993) would
raise the banks' cost of funds by signaling to the market that the bank's  loan portfolio is bad.
In the face of deposit outflows from the banking sector, real activity will be unaffected only if borrowers have
alternative sources of funding that are very close substitutes for bank loans, or if banks have access to
alternative funding sources themselves, CD's, etc., that can serve as close substitutes for deposit funds. Stein's
argument is that this latter possibility is unlikely. The role of adverse selection problems in amplifying the
effects of deposit runs on real economics activity, can be illustrated using a model based on Myers and Majluf
(1984).  This simple example can serve to illustrate the effect of deposit outflows on the banking sector's
ability to finance real investments. The example is developed more fully by Stein (1995); see also Gibbon
(1992).
Suppose a bank has existing assets (loans), V, whose value can be either G (high) or B (low); G > B. The ex-
ante probability that V = B is p. The bank also can make new loans in amount L which offer a gross rate of
return of R > r where r is the alternative safe rate of return; hence, the new loans are worth undertaking. The
bank's  flow balance sheet is L = (I - q)D + E, where q is the reserve requirement ratio, D is the flow of new
insured deposits, while E represents non-deposit sources of funds which we can view as equity. In order to
assess the impact of a deposit outflow on the ability of the bank to substitute noninsured external funding in
order to maintain it's lending, D will be treated as exogenous.37
Asymmetric information is introduced by assuming the bank knows whether V is worth G or B. This
information, though, is publicly unverifiable. We further assume that L > (I - q)D, so that all banks need to
raise nondeposit funds in order to fully fund all new profitable loans. Investors will invest in the bank if and
only if
s{[pB + (I  - p)G] + RL - (I - q)D} 2 rE,
where s is the share of bank value promised to the investor. This condition simply requires that the expected
gross return to the investor exceed r. For the bank, though, raising external funds can be shown to be
worthwhile only if
s < RE/[V + RE + (R - 1)(1 -q)D]
This condition is less likely to be met by banks for whom V = G. That is, raising external funds will be more
likely to be profitable for banks with low value assets. Thus, good banks will have an incentive to separate
themselves from bad banks by raising fewer external funds. In fact, in a separating equilibrium, bad banks offer
a share s = RE/[B + RE + (R- I)(1  -q)D] while good banks offer an s < RE/[G + RE + (R- I)( I-q)D]. As a result,
not all potential borrowers from good banks will be funded and investment will be inefficiently low.
Annex  2
Consider a monetary sector in isolation in that real and nominal income is predetermined.  The financial system
is the simplest possible with a banking system, and the exchange rate is fixed.  Banks hold three assets, reserves
R, loans L and domestic government securities B.  Banks issue two liabilities, domestic demand deposits M,
henceforth "money", and nonmonetary deposits D, henceforth "deposits", that carry a legal reserve requirement
of t.  Firms issue bank loans only.  They cannot issue bonds to other residents or to nonresidents.  The absence
of both a nonbank bond market and a market for bank equity reflect asymmetric information and regulatory
constraints.  The central bank issues reserves for the banks R; its assets are domestic government securities B
and foreign reserve assets R*.  The relevant balance sheet constraints are
(1)  R=tM+tD
(2)  L+B=(I-t)M+(l-t)D38
We assume  that foreign  bonds, domestic  government  bonds and deposits  are perfect  substitutes  for both
residents  and nonresidents.  Given  the credibility  of the lender  of last resort commitment  and the fixed
exchange  rate commitment,  this means  that  the domestic  deposit  rate is always  equal  to the foreign  interest  rate.
Residents'  demand  for money  is
(3)  Md = M( r, Y)
Equation  (3) defines  a traditional  LM  curve in (r, Y) space.
Bank profits are equal to pL + rB - rD = [p(l-t)  - r]D + p(l-t)M  + (r - p)B, where p is the loan rate. Profit
maximization requires that p(l-t)  - r = 0 or p = r/(l-t).  Since this implies that the loan rate exceeds r, r - p < 0
and B = 0.
If firm demand  for loans is given by L(p) = L(r/(l-t)), L' < 0, then equilibrium  in the loan market  requires
that L(r/(l-t)) = (I-t)[M(r,Y)  + DI, or using  (1), this can be written  as
(4)  L(r/(l-t))=(l-t)RJt
which  determines  the equilibrium  level of reserves,  given the world interest  rate.
In the context  of this model  we can evaluate  the effects  of high  reserve  requirements.  The shock  to the
system  that seems  most relevant is a change  in the yield  demanded  by residents  and nonresidents  that  makes
them indifferent  between  domestic  bank deposits  and foreign  assets. This  yield might  change because  investors
fear default  on domestic  deposits  because  of capital  losses  on banks' loan portfolio,  expectations  that domestic
currency  deposits  might  fall in value  due  to devaluation  of the exchange  rate or simply  a rise in the foreign
interest  rate. In the text, we also argue  that changes  in exchange  rate  expectations  might interact  with
expectations  concerning  the solvency  of the banking  system,  but for now we focus on the simple  case of a
change in the foreign  interest  rate.
Holding  income  constant,  we can solve  this system  for the change  in reserves  (and by the balance  of
payments  constraint  the private  capital inflow)  as a function  of the change  in the foreign  interest  rate  as follows
(5)  dR/dr*  =  tL' / (I-t)2
where subscripts  are partial  derivatives.39
Equation  (5) implies  that  the change  in the demand  for bank reserves  following  a change  in the world
interest  rate  depends  on the structure  of reserve  requirements  and the elasticity  of the loan demand  to the loan
rate.
The model  can be made  somewhat  more  general  by allowing  the loan  rate to differ from r/(l -t). We argued
above  that  the loan  rate  might  react slowly,  partially,  and  perhaps  not at all to changes  in the deposit  rate. In this
case,  bank loan  supply  will be increasing  in the loan  rate p and decreasing  in  the deposit  rate r. Loan  demand  by
firms  will be decreasing  in p and increasing  in the level  of income:  Ld(p,y).  Consequently,  there  will be a locus
of income  and loan  rate combinations  consistent  with  loan  market  equilibrium  that will depend  on the loan
supply behavior  of banks  and the demand  for loans  by firms.
We now  consider  the response  of the system  to a change  in foreign  interest  rates  when  income  is free  to adjust.
It is clear  that  the elasticity  of the loan  market  equilibrium  locus  with  respect  to the world  interest  rate  holding  the
loan rate  constant  is likely  to be very  low  in a repressed  system.  Given  our assumption  that  domestic  deposits  and
domestic  bonds  are perfect  substitutes  for foreign  bonds,  "the"  interest  rate  that  appears  in  the goods  market  (IS)
relationship  can be thought  of as the domestic  deposit  rate. Changes  in this  rate, other  things  equal,  might  affect
savings  decisions  but because  of the offsetting  income  and substitution  effects  the sign of the effect  is ambiguous.
Consider  again  the conventional  M-F  framework.  In this  model  the response  of the real economy  is captured
by the slope  of the IS curve. As the world  interest  rate falls  domestic  investment  rises  and the demand  for money
rises because  of the increase  in  nominal  GDP. Clearly  capital  mobility  means  that  the government  must increase
the monetary  base  by a fraction  of the increase  in  the demand  for  money.
Now consider  the complete  model  with  the credit  market  included.  The  change  in international  reserves  in
response  to a change  in  the foreign  interest  rate  is
(5)  dRldr* =  [t'(LpPr+  LyYpPr)  + (t-t'XMr + My*Yp*pr')] / (I-t')
Capital  controls  in the form of reserve  requirements  on nonresident  deposits  have  two  interesting  effects.
First,  they imply  a larger  private  capital  inflow  and change  in reserves  is associated  with  a given  disturbance  in  the
foreign  interest  rate. Second,  they tend  to increase,  other  things  equal,  the change  in  the bank  lending  rate  and
therefore  the real  effect  of the foreign  interest  rate  change.40
Why do countries employ reserve requirements that appear to be counterproductive in that they magnify
changes in intemational reserves? So far we have focused on the effects of a given reserve regime as world interest
rates change.  But what is the effect of a change in the differential reserve? Suppose for example that a fall in the
world interest rate and the resulting capital inflow induces the government  to raise the reserve requirement. The
impact effect on the demand for loans is
(6)  dL/dt' = Lp * pt.
which is negative. Assuming  that t remains equal to t' the impact effect on reserves is
(7)  dR/dt' = (Lp * p,.)  / (  -t)
The immediate effect is to reduce the capital inflow and the gain in reserves. But other things equal the cost of
bank loans clearly rises.  In effect the domestic borrower must pay the tax on the marginal foreign money. This
has the effect of discouraging the transmission  of the real effects of the interest rate change.  So evidently a
constant high reserve requirement has perverse effects. But an endogenous  reserve requirement policy that
increases  reserve ratios as world rates fall succeeds in insulating the domestic loan market from the extemal shock.
The "sterilization" policy succeeds not because it discourages international  capital mobility but because it
discourages domestic financial intermediation.
There are also the seeds of a banking system crisis in this model. The intuition is that the increasing tax of the
capital controls falls on domestic loan rates.  In turn, if the banks and the regulators are not careful only high risk
borrowers will accept these terms. The key here is that we have set the stage so that capital controls work not
through distorting traded asset returns as is typical in the standard model, but instead through distorting the cost of
domestic financial intermediation. This distortion might limit the impact on domestic spending decisions as we
have discussed here. But if the incentive  for banks is to survive with negative net worth the same policies could
fuel a speculative boom that more often than not will end in a bust.41
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I  This ratio was derived from data in Freris (1991, page 20) and the Honk Kong Monetary Authority, 1995
2  There is some controversy over how safe the Canadian system really was.  During the  1920s and 1930s,
when 15000 banks disappeared in the United States, only one closed in Canada.  However, it has been argued
(Kryzanowski and Roberts, 1993) that many of the largest Canadian banks were insolvent but remained open
with implicit deposit insurance during the 1930s.  Still, the strength of the Canadian system was that with a
small number of banks, it was possible for the government to ensure that it was only covering non-diversifiable
risk, and indeed losses did not grow, as with most cases of keeping bust banks open.  All the major Canadian
banks emerged intact from the depression, and they appear to have mitigated, rather than magnified, the large
macro disturbance.
3  Calomiris (1990) reports that once the number of banks was over 40. the incentive to monitor appeared to
weaken, as the costs from any failure were more easily spread.
Market participants do not expect the value of assets to remain constant but since further increases or
decreases are equally likely the expected value is permanently reduced.
5  To avoid the emergence of a dual foreign exchange market, the currency board would have to close the
banks and distribute the assets to depositors.  For reasons discussed below, the liquidation of an entire banking
system is probably too costly to be seriously entertained.
6  See Bennett (1994) for an excellent review of recent experience with currency boards in Hong Kong,
Argentina and Estonia.
7  These general problems of adverse selection and moral hazard serve to define many aspects of credit
markets. As Mishkin (1994) emphasizes, many of the characteristic properties associated with financial markets
such as debt contracts, the reliance on security issues for funding only by large nonfinancial firms, collateral,
financial intermediaries and the traditionally high degree of financial market regulation, all arise from the
problems asymmetric information generates. One important implication of the informational problems common
to financial markets is the potential importance they give to noninterest rate factors and quantities in
determining investment activity. The volume of credit, and the level of investment, will depend not just on
interest rate levels but on the asset base of the banking sector as well.
8  The "sunspot" view was first formally modeled by Diamond and Dybvig and subsequently extended by
and Cooper and Ross among others. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), deposit runs result from changes in the
intertemporal consumption preferences of depositors and are unrelated to the underlying value of the banking
sector's assets. Banks engage in maturity transformation, investing deposits in both long-term, illiquid assets
and lower yielding liquid assets. If depositors, as a result of purely exogenous factors, decide to consume before
the long-term asset has matured, banks have insufficient holdings of liquid assets to meet withdrawals and must
attempt to liquidate their long-term assets at a loss. These models of banking panics incorporate some of the
key aspects of modem banking. For example, Cooper and Ross (1992) stress the role that the possibility of
panics has on the lending behavior of banks and the form of the deposit contract they offer to depositors.  See
also Freeman (1988).
9  Mishkin (1994, p. 9) lists five factors promoting financial crises. These are: 1) increases in interest rates; 2)
stock market declines; 3) increases in uncertainty; 4) bank panics; 5) unanticipated declines in inflation.
Interestingly, none (with the possible exception of number 4) deal with contagion effects arising initially from
the failure of a single or small number of banks. Bordo (1989) distinguishes between factors leading to panics
according to whether they are "internal" - arising from poor management, poor judgment, or dishonesty - and
those that are "external" - arising from changes in relative prices and the overall price level. However, this fails
to include the possibility of panics arising from contagion effects. That is, situations in which a well managed
bank might suffer a depositor run as a result of the failure of some other bank.
10  The uniqueness of banks has been argued from two quite different perspectives. In what until recently had
been the dominate view, banks are special, and therefore the potential for bank failures requires public policy46
involvement, because their liabilities form a major fraction of the medium of exchange. That is, the critical role
of banks in the payments system makes them special. Since it is their liabilities that are used for payments, this
view focuses on the liability side of the banking sector and the implications of banking failures for the supply of
money. Specifically, banking sector risks, to the extent that they potentially lead to runs on banks that disrupt
the payments system, can lead to large economic dislocations.  Bordo (1989) illustrates this money view in
arguing that "The need for a lender of last resort arises in a fractional reserve banking system when a banking
panic, defined as a massive scramble for high powered money, threatens the money stock, and hence the level
of economic activity (italic added). The lender of last resort can allay an incipient panic by timely assurance
that it will provide whatever high powered money is required to satisfy the demand, either by offering liberal
access to the discount window at a penalty rate or by open market purchases." Bordo (1989, p. 1).
In this view then, the necessity of developing policies that ensure against large scale banking failures arises
from the impact such failures would have on the money stock and the payments mechanism. And the traditional
role of the LOLR is to provide an elastic supply of high powered money by lending to otherwise solvent banks
facing depositor runs.
A more recent view has focused on the asset side of banks and their role in providing credit. Example of this
view can be found in Bernanke (1983), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), or Williamson (1987); an excellent
summary can be found in Gertler (1988). Building on advances in the economics of imperfect and asymmetric
information, banks are viewed as playing a special role in overcoming problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard in credit markets.  In particular, banks are viewed as having a comparative advantage in monitoring
borrowers, particularly small borrowers, who are engaged in risky activities.
Adverse selection is a particular problem in credit markets since potential borrowers are likely to have better
information about their investment plans and the likelihood of their success then do outside observers. Thus.
any lender will need to engage in monitoring activities, and the cost of such monitoring may make lending
unprofitable. A higher interest rate does not necessarily make such lending profitable, since the pool of
potential borrowers will change as interest rates rise. Higher rates may simply attract a riskier pool of borrowers
and actually lower the lenders' expected return. Under these circumstances, there may be no interest rate that
balances supply and demand, leaving some borrowers unable to obtain financing even though they may have
projects whose expected return exceeds the cost of funds.
If banks have a comparative advantage in monitoring borrowers, perhaps because of localized informational
advantages or because they service the borrower's  transaction account, banks may be able to supply credit to
borrowers who would otherwise be unable to obtain financing. A disruption of lending activity by the banking
industry would therefore have adverse effects on real economic activity.
In this credit view, alternative sources of funding for investment activity are imperfect substitutes for bank
lending. Any contraction of the banking sector's ability to grant credit, therefore, forces borrowers to turn to
other sources of funds or some borrowers may not have access to funding sources. As a result, the level of
capital formation is reduced, with subsequent impacts on the level of economic activity. Thus, by directly
affecting the efficiency of the financial system in funding productive investment projects, banking runs are
likely to generate persistent adverse effects on real economic activity.
This section  draws  on Chinn and Dooley  (1995a).
12  In the more familiar model the demand for reserves changes with money demand because money holders
shift to assets that carry lower reserve requirements.
13 However, it should be noted that supposedly irrevocably fixed exchange rates (Bretton Woods, the CFA
Franc Zone) or common currency areas have not proved to be robust -- or even to get off the ground (EMS) --
in the absence of either significant fiscal transfers or, in their absence, an irrevocable commitment on the part of
surplus areas to expand.
14  This point is contested in the U.S.: proponents of interstate (and in former times, or unit) banking argued
that larger banks from other regions would take over smaller banks and then lend less to local firms, in part due47
to inferior information.  However, if there are local branches, then there remains a point at which local
information can be collected (and technology increasingly reduces the costs associated with gathering
information from a distance). The issue may turn on incentives:  can distant managers be motivated to respond
prudently on the basis of local information.  Foreign banks also regularly enjoy a diversification over domestic
banks; thus even if, all other things equal, Mexican banks today would be more likely to lend in Mexico given
the same information, their previous concentration on Mexican assets has so weakened their portfolios that such
a recovery is unlikely.
1'  Such alliances imply that the foreign bank has a fairly accurate view of the portfolio quality of the
Argentine bank and thus is more willing to accept assets in a crisis. Formal lines of credit or contingent lines all
suffer from the "adverse materiality" clauses, which might be invoked, for example, if there were changes in the
political constellation which were seen to affect expectations, even if the financial indicators were unchanged.
Thus, lenders may charge a lot for contingent lines, but they may not actually be available in a systemic crisis.
The alternative of formal linkages among banks, particularly in cases such as the Mexico-induced crisis of
confidence, might be more effective in providing immediate liquidity. Of course these alliances are more likely
for larger banks, and in general if one believes that risks are better diversified and capital more easily raised for
larger banks, then the consolidation of Argentine banks in recent years may well lead to banks better able to
fend for themselves.
16  The April 1995 revision to the Law on Financial Entities contains in Article 35 bis on restructuring
sweeping powers for the BCRA in defense of depositors, including the exclusion of assets and liabilities and
transfer of same to other financial entities.  The law also allows the BCRA to provide rediscounts for longer
than 30 days and for accounts larger than the bank's net worth in extraordinary circumstances.
7  See Corrigan ( 1996) for an assessment of the Argentine banking system and recommendations for reform.
18  Their work forms the basis of the model developed by Stein (1994) as well.Policy Research Working Paper Series
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